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Studies on governance have undergone rapid 
development since the last decades of the twentieth 
century when entrepreneurs, managers and 
administrators of large companies began to pay 
considerable attention to the subject. The actual 
debate develops as a result of the numerous 
financial scandals connected to the use of illegal 
practices by entrepreneurs and administrators who 
have contributed to the search for optimal models of 
governance able to increase information 
transparency of companies and safeguard the 
interests of many stakeholders who come into 
contact with it. Just think of the failures of Fanny 
Mae, Tyco, Northern Rock, Enron, Adelphia, Arthur 
Anderson, Freddy Mac, WorldCom, Goldman Sachs, 
Marconi, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers and Yukos 
(Duke & Kankpang, 2011). Most reported cases of 
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In recent years, both corporate governance and performance 
management have been subjected to considerable changes. In 
this dynamic context, it is interesting to study the evolution of 
the relationship between performance and governance. Does 
governance still affect performance? The purpose of this paper 
is to verify the presence and intensity (extent) of the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance in 
Italian listed companies by using both accounting and non-
accounting performance measures. The purpose of this paper is 
to investigate the effects of prior firm performance on board 
composition and governance structure of some companies 
listed on the Italian stock exchange, analysing how a governance 
approach influences the performance of sample companies. For 
the research the methodology used is quantitative and we used 
regression analysis on a sample of 23 Italian listed companies: 
mechanical companies and public utilities to find that the 
company's performance was positively related to the size of the 
board. The empirical analysis conducted allowed us to verify the 
hypothesis according to which the increase in Corporate 
Governance Best Practices influences company performance. 
However, the results we have received do not allow us to arrive 
at completely unequivocal interpretations. The results showed 
we have received do not allow us to arrive at completely 
unequivocal interpretations; the main limit is the sample size 
used in this study was relatively small. 
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governance practices (Appiah, 2013). This 
recognition has led to a broader approach or 
perspective of corporate governance, not only on 
satisfying the interests of shareholders but with an 
awareness that involves corporate responsibilities at 
a whole (Huse, 2007). What has just been said, 
together with the privatization processes, the 
importance of the role of institutional investors in 
the risk capital of large companies, and the 
progressive integration of financial markets, raise 
corporate governance to a distinctive element for the 
company. Then lead also to the conclusion that the 
best-governed company is a less risky and certainly 
more competitive company. Good governance soon 
becomes synonymous with economic success or 
good business performance (Donaldson, 2019).  
The awareness that good governance is 
equivalent to good performance contributes to the 
rapid development by the many industrialized 
countries, each according to its own peculiarities, of 
adequate codes of conduct (soft law) which, together 
with the different laws (hard low), they try to 
prevent and/or mitigate the many cases of business 
failure. 
There are several studies in support of the fact 
that good corporate governance contributes to 
economic stability by enhancing the performance of 
companies and increasing their access to outside 
capital. Moreover, these studies state that the long-
term market value and profitability of companies 
can be maximized through the adoption of good 
governance practices (Khumani, Stone, & Hurly, 
1998; Banerjee, Gokarn, Pattanayak, & Sinha, 2009); 
for example, state that good corporate governance is 
necessary in all economic transactions that 
companies want to put in place. However, scholars 
to this day are not perfectly in agreement if the 
adoption of good governance rules has a positive or 
negative impact on company results. In fact, some 
studies show a positive relationship (Bebchuk & 
Weisbach, 2010); others highlight a negative 
relationship (Bøhren & Strøm, 2010) and others do 
not report any relationship (Darmadi, 2011; 
Alvarado, Briones, & Ruiz, 2011) between corporate 
governance and business performance (Ghabayen, 
2012). Many instead recognize the importance of the 
board of directors increased due to its fundamental 
oversight role (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Minichilli, 
Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2007). Indeed, boards are 
increasingly considered as fundamental and 
essential assets for companies with the potential to 
contribute to sustainable competitive advantage 
(Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007). In light of what 
has just been said, the idea of the work originates 
that trying to analyse in detail the governance of 
some companies listed on the Italian stock exchange, 
analysing through a quantitative approach how the 
different composition and structure of the board 
influences the performance of examined companies, 
i.e. those of our survey sample: mechanical 
companies and public utilities.  
In the context outlined, public service 
companies have changed their corporate structures 
through the legal transformation of capital 
companies and the entry of private shareholders 
into the share capital with the immediate 
consequence that the corporate structure has 
become articulated and heterogeneous; each 
member has very different characteristics, aims and 
weight. Thus, other stakeholders are used alongside 
traditional stakeholders: small investors, 
institutional investors and banks, financial analysts, 
and not least the State as a regulator. In this context, 
it is clear that convergent interests are increasing 
and rules and rules of conduct dictated by the 
collection of risk capital in the stock market are 
added. Therefore, even in public utility companies, 
the debate on the topic of corporate governance has 
taken on an increasingly important role both in 
terms of defining the structure, composition and 
appointment processes of the governing bodies, and 
in terms of the activity carried out and in terms of 
dissemination of the results achieved and of the 
procedures that have enabled it to be achieved. 
In public utilities, corporate governance 
assumed much more complex and relevant role than 
in other companies: market regulation, public-
private ownership, political connections and 
multiple agency relationships may change the 
company’s objectives and relationships. 
For this reason, we have considered 
appropriate to investigate the effects of prior firm 
performance on board composition and governance 
structure. For the research the methodology used is 
quantitative and we used regression analysis on a 
sample of some Italian listed companies: mechanical 
companies and public utilities to find that the 
company's performance was positively related to the 
size of the board. 
The empirical analyses conducted suggest that 
the appropriate size of the board of directors, the 
right distribution of independent directors, and the 
cost-benefit analysis in conducting frequent 
meetings can help public utilities improve their 
performance. 
In the elaboration of the dataset, as far as 
governance data is concerned, the analysis of the 
corporate governance reports published annually by 
each company was used, while, for the performance 
data, only one important financial statement 
indicator was used, i.e. the ROE. The variables taken 
into consideration were divided into tables 
according to a criterion that led to interesting 
conclusions, proceeding to a regression and 
correlation analysis. The study also found the 
presence of dummy variables; in this regard, a 
selection was made of those variables which could 
be more significant than others. 
 
2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Taking a historical overview, the topic of governance 
is already detected by the first classical economists: 
Adam Smith and Marshall. The evolution of 
corporate governance has allowed an increase in 
institutional communications. The purpose of this is 
to establish effective relationships with social 
interlocutors to obtain clear, comprehensible and 
truthful answers to the information needs of the 
stakeholders. In addition to the communication of 
the financial statements, the social report, the 
sustainability report, the report on corporate 
governance, etc. were added. On the subject of 
corporate governance, there are many different 
strands of institutional theory, from micro-level 
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sociological approaches, which focus mainly on 
internal organizational dynamics (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991) to economic and socio-economic 
macro-approaches that seek to connect the 
behaviour firm to wider social realities. One of the 
main concerns of the first concerns the 
incorporation of organizational processes and 
routines and the way in which these are legitimized 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Meanwhile, the latter 
focuses on the relationship between institutions at 
the social level – and the dominant patterns they 
take – and company-level practices (Wood, Dibben, & 
Ogden, 2014; Ciftci, Tatoglu, Wood, Demirbag, & 
Zaim, 2019). In the national context, Borsa Italiana 
S.p.A. prescribes the preparation of an annual report 
on governance, for the compilation of which 
numerous organizations. In particular, Borsa 
Italiana, Assonime and Emittenti Titoli S.p.A. have 
prepared specific guidelines and formats aimed at 
facilitating companies. The governance report must 
show a description of the corporate structure, 
highlighting the functions and powers of the bodies 
as a meeting, administrative bodies and control 
bodies, in addition to the procedures required for 
the choice of the directors, of those who deal with 
control and their term in office. In general, the 
existing literature on boards of directors, ownership 
and performance has tended to focus on changes in 
internal corporate governance mechanisms within 
liberal market frameworks and on exploring the 
ways in which shareholder rights can be applied to 
maximize shareholder value (Ciftci et al., 2019). It 
should be noted that the information received from 
the governance reports is the basis for different 
studies and analyses of an important economic 
matrix; specifically, the examination of the 
relationship between the specific influences of the 
corporate governance of the institutions and the 
performance of the company, measured using 
market-based accounting performance indicators, 
provides a methodological contribution towards a 
better articulation of the performance link between 
corporate governance and companies in the context 
of an emerging market economy (Singh, Tabassum, 
Darwish, & Batsakis, 2018; Ciftci et al., 2019).  
Khamis, Hamdan, and Elali (2015) found that 
there is a significant relationship between 
performance and ownership measured by ROA. 
Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) also investigated the 
impact of corporate governance on the performance 
of listed companies in Bahrain and their results 
show that corporate governance is significantly 
correlated with company performance. Another 
study in China (Sami, Wang, & Zhou, 2011) discussed 
the link between operations performance and 
corporate governance. The results show a positive 
relationship between company governance measures 
and operational performance. Other research claims 
the opposite. In Sri Lanka Guo and Kga (2012) test 
how the impact of good governance practices affects 
business performance. It was found that the size of 
the board is negatively associated with the value of 
the company. Just as the results of a research 
conducted in Malaysia, Fooladi and Nikzad 
Chaleshtori (2011) who studied the effects of 
corporate governance on the performance of local 
businesses show that corporate governance is 
negatively associated with ROA. 
Veliyath (1999) the board should monitor 
managers “behaviors for shareholders” interests, 
make important decisions, employ teams and 
superintend firms to obey the law. Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) and Singh and Davidson 
(2003) reveal that the board’s dimensions are 
negatively correlated to company performance. 
However, Bacon (1973) has an opposite view 
that implies broader advise members with different 
backgrounds and views, which is useful for the 
quality of decisions; Fama and Jensen (1983) detect 
that internal directors, by virtue of their positions, 
possess more information, are likely to collude with 
managers and make decisions against shareholders. 
By comparison, external directors in a neutral 
position, acting as supervisor, are good for 
eliminating principal-agency problem. 
The subject of numerous studies is also the 
duality of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); the 
duality refers to the non-separation of roles between 
CEO and Chairman of the Board. In a situation of 
normality, the cards with the duality of the CEO are 
perceived as ineffective because a conflict of interest 
could arise. This is often attributed to the nature of 
family-run businesses in developing countries 
(Soliman & Elsalam, 2012). From the following study, 
it emerges that the duality of the roles of CEO and 
president is able to improve the monitoring 
mechanisms of performance linked to management; 
according to other scholars, the question of the 
duality of the CEO tells us little about whether 
he/she is a member of the family or not, which can 
have a stronger effect on the relations of the board 
of directors (Ciftci et al., 2019). Still, on the subject 
of corporate governance, some studies state that 
effective corporate governance reduces the “control 
rights” of how much shareholders and creditors 
confer on managers, increasing the likelihood that 
managers invest in projects of positive net value 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), suggesting that the best-
governed companies have better operational 
performances, our first prosecutor for solid 
performance (Brown & Caylor, 2009).  
The corporate governance mechanisms, which 
are already a delicate issue for listed companies in 
general, seem even more complex for public utilities, 
in which the interests of local communities and 
public institutions that represent them tend by their 
nature to diverge from those of investors, financial 
and securities markets. As already stated, the 
governance in these companies should allow us to 
satisfy a triple interest, namely to guarantee respect 
for the legality and transparency of administrative 
action, protect the public shareholder and the 
interest of the community that the company is 
serving, ensuring a balanced distribution of powers 
within the institutional bodies of the company. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in these 
types of companies the composition of the board 
often has a staff that is dimensioned above where 
policy administrators do not pursue any social 
purpose by focusing their attention on pursuing 
popular consensus. Their theory is based on the fact 
that companies controlled by a public body, such as 
the companies we analyse, are pushed to adopt 
employment expansion strategies for political ends. 
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Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) instead focused 
their studies on the figure of external administrators 
who seem to have a negative effect on company 
performance from their research; this effect seems 
to be motivated by the fact that a greater number of 
the board, enlarged for political reasons, leads to the 
presence of too many external members. 
Political influence due to the inclusion of 
outsiders in the board, and this is one of the reasons 
for bigger board size does not affect firm 
performance positively (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
In such companies, the corporate governance 
assumed a particular connotation that should allow 
for the satisfaction of a threefold interest; to the 
establishment of the public bodies of the company. 
In a public utility company, there are two different 
approaches to the need to reconcile different 
interests and situations of abuse by the majority 
shareholders appearing to be fundamental in the 
context of government bodies (in particular within 
the management board). Public subjects that hold, 
by law, by statutes, a significant amount of shares, 
represent the majority shareholders. It is precisely 
the management board, in such companies, that 
fulfils the role of protection and negotiation of the 
different interests presented among the 
stakeholders. 
 
3. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
The purpose of this work is to analyse the way in 
which corporate governance influences the 
performance of the companies that are the object of 
our analysis, namely mechanical companies and 
public utilities.  
It was decided to analyse the engineering 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 
view of the increase in exports and volumes. The 
metalworking industry plays a particularly 
important role in Italy both in terms of employment 
and international exchanges and for the strategic 
role it fulfils, contributing decisively to the 
development of the country and to the preservation 
of the levels of competition of the entire industrial 
sector. Furthermore, it concerns the totality of 
investment assets in machines and equipment 
through which it transmits technological innovation 
to all branches of industry and other sectors of the 
economy. 
Public utilities have been chosen as companies 
that deal with the provision and management of 
public services to the community. Particularly 
interesting is the evolution of the regulatory process 
that concerns them. The liberalization process that 
led to the division and management segmentation of 
the production, distribution and sales chain, to 
operate more and more like private companies, with 
the consequent and constant reduction of public 
capital in the shareholding accompanied by the 
intent to re-launch investments by private entities, 
all through the creation of new governance 
structures. 
To share these companies is the chosen 
administrative and control model, that is the 
traditional one which envisages the presence of a 
Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors 
and an external auditor. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
In Italy the studies on Corporate Governance are 
latest than in the other countries of the world; what 
has been said stems from the fact that the national 
literature on the subject is quite recent. 
Tendentiously, the studies are articulated in 
particular on three aspects: analysis of the problems 
linked to the structure of the Italian economic 
system; analysis on the size and composition of the 
Board of Directors; analysis of the correlations 
between governance and performance. 
In recent years, several researches have been 
carried out to verify the hypothesis that the increase 
in Corporate Governance Best Practices influences 
company performance.  
The empirical analysis conducted allowed us to 
verify the hypothesis according to which the 
increase in Corporate Governance Best Practices 
influences company performance. However, the 
results we have received do not allow us to arrive at 
completely unequivocal interpretations. 
The sample considered consists of 10 
companies in the mechanical sector in particular: 
Biesse, Brembo, Carraro, Emak, Fincantieri, 
Leonardo, Piaggio, Pininfarina, Prima Industrie, Sabaf 
and 13 companies belonging to the public utility 
sector, in particular, A2a, Acea, Alerion, Ascopiave, 
Edison, Enel, Erg, Hera. Iren, KRenergy, Terna, 
Ternienergia, FalckRenewables. 
The dataset analysed in the following study 
examines some companies related to the public 
utility sector, characterized by companies that 
operate purely in the national territory in a 
particularly complex and engineering and regulatory 
framework; in this case, the metalworking industry 
plays a particularly important role in Italy both in 
terms of employment and international exchanges, 
and for the strategic role it fulfils, decisively 
contributing to the development of the country and 
to the preservation of the levels of competition of 
the entire industrial sector. The methodology used is 
quantitative. We analysed the governance 
relationships of the companies in the sample for the 
three-year period (2015-2017). To share these 
companies is the chosen administrative and control 
model, that is the traditional one which envisages 
the presence of a Board of Directors, the Board of 
Statutory Auditors and an external auditor. 
In the elaboration of the dataset, with regard to 
the governance data, the analysis of the corporate 
governance relations published annually by each 
company was used, while, for the performance data, 
only one important indicator of the balance sheet 
was used, namely the ROE. To correlate the 
governance variables to the company performance 
we used a single financial statement indicator: the 
ROE (accounting measure), the most popular 
financial measure was used. 
The ROE has been employed largely by scholars 
to investigate the relationship between performance 
and corporate governance (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 
2003; Baysinger & Butler, 1985) since it shows how 
much profit a company has. 
The study also found the presence of dummy 
variables; in this regard, a selection was made of 
those variables that could be more significant than 
others. 
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5. DISCUSSION  
 
The companies analysed are companies listed on the 
Italian Stock Exchange and concern the engineering 
sector and the public utilities sector. 
The companies chosen are the administration 
and control model chosen, that is the traditional one 
which envisages the presence of a Board of 
Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors and an 
external auditor. 
The analysed dataset concerns the three-year 
period (2015, 2016 and 2017). The variables taken 
into consideration were divided into tables 
according to a criterion that led to interesting 
conclusions. Starting with the engineering companies, 
we obtained the results shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix 
 
 Bsize BM Avg. B. age OWN NMD NA NAI ROE 
Bsize 1        
BM 0.066 1       
Avg. B. age 0.182 0.118 1      
OWN 0.158 -0.201 0.053 1     
NMD 0.221 0.482 0.222 -0.546 1    
NA 0.112 0.061 -0.070 0.232 -0.141 1   
NAI 0.060 0.055 0.0190 0.198 -0.139 0.956 1  
ROE 0.278 -0.053 -0.030 -0.203 0.132 -0.344 -0.344 1 
Note: Bsize = board size; BM = board meetings; Avg. B. age = average age of the board of directors for the firm in the current 
year; OWN = percentage of shares held by the first shareholder; NMD = number of minority directors; NA = number of newly 
appointed directors; NAI = number of newly appointed independent directors; ROE = return on equity. 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that R2 equals 0.488. 
That is why we can say that the regressors predict 
very well the value of the dependent variable. 
The correlation between ROE and the size of 
the Board of Directors is positive and assumes a 
good value, equal to 0.278, i.e. the increase in the 
number of members of the Board increases the 
profitability of the companies. In fact, a larger Board 
has greater supervisory power over managers due to 
the greater number of people who control 
management operations and the behaviour of 
managers. The number of meetings of -0.053 is 
negatively correlated with the ROE. 
Even the average age correlates negatively to 
the dependent variable of -0.029, while minority 
directors positively correlate for a value of 0.132. 
The percentage of shares held by the first 
shareholder has a negative influence on the ROE for 
a value of -0.203. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 ED END IB CEOs CEO is Chair and President Chair ex ROE 
ED 1       
END -0.544 1      
IB -0.430 0.656 1     
CEOs -0.028 0.045 0.081 1    
CEO is Chair and President 0.357 -0.463 0.182 0.167 1   
Chair ex 0.448 -0.410 -0.657 0.111 -0.167 1  
ROE 0.133 0.157 0.139 0.046 -0.042 0.063 1 
Note: ED = number of executive directors; END = number of non-executive directors; IB = independents on board; CEO = chief 
executive officers on board; CEO is Chair and President = indicator equals 1 if the CEO is not the Chair and President of the board of 
directors otherwise 0; Chair ex = indicator equals 1 if the President of the board is also executive director, otherwise indicator equals 0; 
ROE = return on equity. 
 
In Table 2 the regression analysis leads to the 
achievement of homogeneous results, i.e. all the 
governance variables have very high significant 
values except for the variable indicating the number 
of executive directors. 
The determination coefficient is equal to 0.117 
and this means that the proportion of total variation 
of the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variable is modest. The number of 
executive directors is positively correlated with the 
ROE and is equal to 0.133, so the profitability of the 
company increases as the number of executive 
directors increases. The number of non-executive 
directors is also positively correlated with r = 0.157. 
There is a positive correlation of 0.139 between the 
number of independent directors and the ROE. This 
positive influence is due to the fact that the Boards 
of Directors, composed of a significant number of 
independent members, reduce the managerial power 
and the information asymmetry, increasing the 
vigilance on any opportunistic behaviour of the 
management and appropriately protecting the 
interests of all shareholders. 
Among the managing directors and the ROE, 
there is a positive correlation, but rather small, 
equal to 0.046 and therefore it is agreed that the 
increase in the managing directors on profitability is 
not particularly significant. There is a negative 
correlation r = -0.042 among managing directors who 
can also play the role of chairman and ROE. This 
result is in line with the studies carried out in 2011 
by Dey, Engel, and Liu, which documents the lower 
return that is achieved by not dividing the role of 
the chief executive officer from that of chairman, 
resulting in the reduced possibility of making 
investments to the advantage of shareholder capital. 
The duality CEO, in fact, reduces the 
performance of the company because the CEO could 
filter the information available to the other members 
of the Board, preventing effective control. It could 
also happen that the CEO duality, taking advantage 
of its decision-making and operational power, can 
undertake opportunistic behaviours in contrast with 
minority shareholders. There is also a negative 
correlation of -0.063 between the executive chair and 
the ROE. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
 WB PW W_E W_NE W_NEI FW FWP FWE FWNE FWNEI ROE 
WB 1           
PW 0 1          
W_E 0.122 0 1         
W_NE 0 0 0 1        
W_NEI 0 0 0 0 1       
FW -0.016 0 0.764 0 0 1      
FWP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1     
FWE -0.016 0 0.764 0 0 1 0 1    
FWNE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   
FWNEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
ROE 0.328 0 0.250 0 0 0.149 0 0.149 0 0 1 
Note: WB = number of women on board; PW = indicator equals 1 if the woman is President of the board of director, otherwise the 
indicator equals 0; W_E = indicator equals 1 if the woman is executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator equals 0; 
W_NE = indicator equals 1 if the woman is not executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator equals 0; W_NEI = indicator 
equals 1 if the woman is not Independent executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator equals 0; FW  = indicator equals 1 if 
the woman is related with the family of the owner, otherwise the indicator equals 0; FWP = indicator equals 1 if the woman is related 
with the family of the owner and is President of the board of director, otherwise the indicator equals 0; FWE = indicator equals 1 if the 
woman is related with the family of the owner and is executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator equals 0; 
FWNE = indicator equals 1 if the woman is related with the family of the owner and is not executive director of the board, otherwise the 
indicator equals 0; FWNEI = indicator equals 1 if the woman is related with the family of the owner and is not executive independent 
director of the board, otherwise the indicator equals 0; ROE = return on equity. 
 
In Table 3 the coefficient of determination R2 is 
equal to 0.153. The presence of women on the Board 
of Directors is very positively correlated with the 
profitability of the companies for a value of r equal 
to 0.328. 
It also experiments how, as women become 
more executive directors, the ROE increases, in fact, 
the correlation value is equal to 0.250. 
This value comes out because the entry of 
women on the Board of Directors has brought some 
improvement on the boards: the female 
representation has increased the percentage of 
graduates in addition to the decrease in the average 
age. But the most important consideration is 
precisely what this analysis revealed: the 
improvement in the companies’ economic 
performance. The motivation is to be found in the 
fact that a selection process was carried out which 
did not fully take into account the gender but, 
rather, the competencies. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
 NID F_P F_E F_NE F_NEI ROE 
NID 1      
F_P 0.087 1     
F_E 0.087 1 1    
F_NE 0.947 -0.120 -0.120 1   
F_NEI 0.833 -0.089 -0.089 0.745 1  
ROE 0.208 -0.001 -0.001 0.186 0.190 1 
Note: NID = number of directors of the board who are not Italian; F_P = indicator equals 1 if the President of the board of 
director is a foreign person, otherwise, the indicator is equal to 0; F_E = indicator equals 1 if the executive the board of director is a 
foreign person, otherwise, the indicator is equal to 0; F_NE = indicator equals 1 if the non-executive the board of director is a foreign 
person, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; F_NEI = indicator equals 1 if the non-executive independent the board of director is a 
foreign person, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; ROE = return on equity. 
 
Table 4 shows that the number of foreign 
directors is positively related to ROE for a value of 
0.208. 
Bringing together very different members in the 
Board of Directors can improve business results 
because it stimulates creativity, innovation and the 
ability to solve problems. 
The non-executive directors also correlate 
positively with the profitability of the companies for 
r = 0.186. 
In fact, the presence of non-executive directors
with different professional profiles, personal data or 
instructions can optimize the control capacity of the 
Board of Directors. 
The same applies to foreign directors who hold 
non-executive and independent positions, the 
correlation that emerges from the analysis is 0.190. 
However, it is analysed, how the degree of diversity 
changes considerably between the executive and 
non-executive directors, in favour of the latter and, 
in fact, the correlation analysis between these and 
the ROE is negative for a value of -0.00094. 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
 
 NDOA OA OA_P OA_E OA_NE OA_NEI ROE 
NDOA 1       
OA 0.191 1      
OA_P 0.132 0.631 1     
OA_E 0.210 0.567 0.945 1    
OA_NE 0.461 0.901 0.523 0.505 1   
OA_NEI 0.483 0.788 0.329 0.299 0.937 1  
ROE 0.129 -0.303 -0.008 0.0005 -0.049 0.120 1 
Note: NDOA = number of directors appointed in other companies; OA = average of appointment in other companies; 
OA_P = number of other appointment in other companies with the position of President of the board of directors; OA_E = number of 
other appointment in other companies with the position of executive director of the Board; OA_NE = number of other appointment in 
other companies with the position of non-executive director of the board; OA_NEI = number of other appointment in other companies 
with the position of non-executive independent director of the board; ROE = return on equity. 
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In Table 5 the variables that have a higher 
significance value are those that concern the other 
offices of the executive directors and the non-
executive ones equal respectively to 0.948 and 0.983. 
The coefficient of determination is quite high, that 
is, equal to 0.738 and this means that the regressors 
predict well the value of the dependent variable. 
The number of directors with other positions 
correlates very positively with the ROE for a value of 
r = 0.129 while the average of the other positions 
negatively influences the profitability of the 
companies for r = -0.303. 
The positive correlation between directors with 
other positions and performances is linked to the 
greater experience and expertise that the directors 
acquire from other Boards of Directors. 
The possibility that presidents may have other 
tasks has a negative influence on the ROE of r = -
0.008. In the event that both positions of managing 
director and chairman of the board converge into a 
single member, this is referred to as CEO duality. 
Although many years have passed since the 
first empirical study on the correlation between CEO 
duality and performance, this relationship is still a 
cause of debate in the discussions concerning 
corporate governance. 
With regard to the dataset relating to public 
utility companies, it was agreed to these results. 
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix 
 
 Bsize BM Avg. B. age OWN NMD NA NAI ROE 
Bsize 1        
BM 0.116 1       
Avg. B. age 0.268 0.240 1      
OWN -0.475 -0.249 0.015 1     
NMD 0.313 0.272 0.151 -0.701 1    
NA -0.125 0.071 -0.250 0.083 0.035 1   
NAI 0.152 0.315 -0.033 -0.123 0.255 0.656 1  
ROE 0.149 -0.079 0.058 0.005 0.293 -0.156 -0.034 1 
Note: Bsize = board size; BM = board meetings; Avg. B. age = average age of the board of directors for the firm in the current 
year; OWN = percentage of shares held by the first shareholder; NMD = number of minority directors; NA = number of newly 
appointed directors; NAI = number of newly appointed independent directors; ROE = return on equity. 
 
In Table 6 we have R2 which is equal to 0.280. 
We can say, therefore, that the regressors predict 
very well the value of the dependent variable. 
The correlation between ROE and the size of 
the Board of Directors is positive and assumes a 
value of 0.149, i.e. the increase in the number of 
members of the Board increases the profitability of 
the companies. In fact, a larger Board has greater 
supervisory power over managers due to the greater 
number of people who control management 
operations and the behaviour of managers. On the 
other hand, the number of meetings of -0.079 is 
negatively correlated to the ROE. 
The average age correlates positively with the 
dependent variable of 0.058, while the minority 
directors correlate very positively with a value of 
0.293. 
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix 
 
 ED END IB CEOs CEO is Chair and President Chair ex ROE 
ED 1       
END -0.244 1      
IB 0.092 0.614 1     
CEOs 0.444 -0.376 -0.243 1    
CEO is Chair and President -0.179 0.489 0.414 -0.299 1   
Chair ex 0.591 -0.067 0.071 0.170 -0.322 1  
ROE -0.267 0.305 0.194 0.034 0.341 -0.131 1 
Note: ED = number of executive directors; END = number of non-executive directors; IB = independents on board; CEO = chief 
executive officers on board; CEO is Chair and President = indicator is equal to 1 if the CEO is not the Chair and President of the board 
of directors otherwise 0; Chair ex = indicator equals 1 if the President of the board is also executive director, otherwise indicator 
equals 0; ROE = return on equity. 
 
In Table 7 the coefficient of determination is 
equal to 0.283 and this means that the proportion of 
total variation of the dependent variable explained 
by the independent variable is high. The number of 
executive directors is negatively correlated with the 
ROE and is equal to -0.267, therefore, as the number 
of executive directors increases, the profitability of 
the company decreases. Instead, the number of non-
executive directors is very positively correlated with 
a value of r = 0.305. There is a positive correlation of 
0.194 between the number of independent directors 
and the ROE. This positive influence is due to the 
fact that the Boards of Directors, composed of a 
significant number of independent members, reduce 
the managerial power and the information 
asymmetry, increasing the vigilance on any 
opportunistic behaviour of the management. Among 
the managing directors and the ROE, there is a 
positive correlation, but rather small, equal to 0.034 
and therefore it is agreed that the increase in the 
managing directors on profitability is not 
particularly significant. There is a positive 
correlation r = 0.341 among managing directors who 
can also play the role of chairman and ROE. 
There is a negative correlation between the 
executive chair and the ROE of -0.131. 
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Table 8. Correlation matrix 
 
 WB PW W_E W_NE W_NEI FW FWP FWE FWNE FWNEI ROE 
WB 1           
PW -0.082 1          
W_E 0.122 -0.182 1         
W_NE 0.124 0.615 -0.118 1        
W_NEI 0.138 0.642 -0.161 0.912 1       
FW 0.157 -0.144 -0.144 -0.094 0.052 1      
FWP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1     
FWE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1    
FWNE 0.157 -0.144 -0.144 -0.094 0.052 1 0 0 1   
FWNEI 0.105 -0.069 -0.069 -0.045 -0.035 0.480 0 0 0.480 1  
ROE 0.082 0.172 -0.493 0.040 0.124 0.068 0 0 0.068 0.076 1 
Note: WB = number of women on board; PW = indicator equals 1 if the woman is President of the board of director, otherwise the 
indicator is equal to 0; W_E = indicator equals 1 if the woman is executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; 
W_NE = indicator equals 1 if the woman is not executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; W_NEI = indicator 
equals 1 if the woman is not independent executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; FW = indicator equals 1 
if the woman is related with the family of the owner, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; FWP = indicator equals 1 if the woman is 
related with the family of the owner and is President of the board of director, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; FWE = indicator 
equals 1 if the woman is related with the family of the owner and is executive director of the board, otherwise the indicator is equal 
to 0; FWNE = indicator equals 1 if the woman is related with the family of the owner and is not executive director of the board, 
otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; FWNEI = indicator equals 1 if the woman is related with the family of the owner and is not 
executive independent director of the board, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; ROE = return on equity. 
 
In Table 8 the coefficient of determination R2 is 
equal to 0.306 and indicates a good proportion of 
the total variation of the performance variable 
explained by those of corporate governance. The 
presence of women on the Board of Directors is 
positively correlated with the profitability of the 
companies for a value of r equal to 0.172. 
This value suggests that the entry of women 
into the Board of Directors brings some 
improvement to the boards: female representation 
has increased the percentage of graduates in 
addition to the decrease in average age. 
 
Table 9. Correlation matrix 
 
 NID F_P F_E F_NE F_NEI ROE 
NID 1     1 
F_P 0.882 1    0.882 
F_E 0.539 0.441 1   0.539 
F_NE 0.576 0.477 0.676 1  0.576 
F_NEI -0.006 -0.039 0.116 0.065 1 -0.006 
ROE 1     1 
Note: NID = number of directors of the board who are not Italian; F_P = indicator equals 1 if the President of the board of 
director is a foreign person, otherwise, the indicator is equal to 0; F_E = indicator equals 1 if the executive the board of director is a 
foreign person, otherwise, the indicator is equal to 0; F_NE = indicator equals 1 if the non-executive the board of director is a foreign 
person, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; F_NEI = indicator equals 1 if the non-executive independent the board of director is a 
foreign person, otherwise the indicator is equal to 0; ROE = return on equity. 
 
From the correlation analysis (see Table 9) it 
emerges that the number of foreign administrators 
correlates negatively to the ROE for a value equal to 
-0.006. 
The executive directors also relate positively to 
the profitability of the companies for r = -0.039. The 
non-executive directors relate positively to the ROE 
for a value of r = 0.116. 
In fact, the presence of non-executive directors 
with different professional profiles, personal data or 
instructions can optimize the control capacity of the 
Board of Directors. 
In the companies under investigation, only a 
few companies have a foreign president in the 
Boards of Directors and the correlation with the ROE 
is negative for r = -0.006. 
 
Table 10. Correlation matrix 
 
 NDOA OA OA_P OA_E OA_NE OA_NEI ROE 
NDOA 1       
OA 0.658 1      
OA_P 0.357 0.520 1     
OA_E 0.581 0.651 0.105 1    
OA_NE 0.736 0.762 0.566 0.449 1   
OA_NEI 0.735 0.597 -0.094 0.694 0.548 1  
ROE 0.034 -0.008 0.009 -0.114 0.750 0.090 1 
Note: NDOA = number of directors appointed in other companies; OA = average of appointment in other companies; 
OA_P = number of other appointment in other companies with the position of President of the board of directors; OA_E = number of 
other appointment in other companies with the position of executive director of the Board; OA_NE = number of other appointment in 
other companies with the position of non-executive director of the board; OA_NEI = number of other appointment in other companies 
with the position of non-executive independent director of the board; ROE = return on equity. 
 
Table 10 shows a rather small coefficient of 
determination that is equal to 0.084 and this means 
that the regressors do not predict very well the value 
of the dependent variable. 
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The number of directors with appointments in 
other companies is correlated positively with the 
ROE for a value of r = 0.034. The positive correlation 
between directors with other positions and 
performances is linked to the greater experience and 
expertise that the directors acquire participating in 
other Boards of Directors. 
The possibility that presidents may have other 
tasks has a positive influence on the ROE of 
r = 0.009. The other positions held by the executive 
directors are negatively correlated even though of a 
very low value equal to -0.114. With regard to non-
executive directors, as this governance variable 
increases, the performance one increases by 0.075. 
There are better performances in companies where 
there is a greater presence of non-executive and 
independent directors who have other offices, for a 
value of r = 0.090. 
After having verified the research hypotheses it 
is necessary to make some considerations on the 
most important variables involved in the empirical 
analysis. 
In the event that both positions of managing 
director and chairman of the board converge into a 
single member, this is referred to as CEO duality. 
Although many years have passed since the 
first empirical study on the correlation between CEO 
duality and performance, this relationship is still a 
cause of debate in the discussions concerning 
corporate governance. 
In the past few years, stock market 
management companies and companies in charge of 
controlling listed companies, have pressed 
companies to avoid overlapping roles in a single 
person. But not all companies have highlighted these 
considerations as there is empirical evidence that 
shows positive effects for the companies that adopt 
this governance. 
This hypothesis holds that the management 
unit is promoted, especially in the decision-making 
phase. But more recent studies show that CEO 
duality has a negative influence on performance 
because the CEO could hide useful information from 
other members of the Board. 
As for independent administrators, recent 
studies have begun to show different results 
compared to those of the past. 
The empirical studies of Nguyen and Xu (2010) 
show that independent directors are an added value 
for companies and that they are able to show good 
managerial performance in the Board of Directors 
and shareholders. 
A topic that is very interesting to scholars is 
that of having inside the boards, administrators who 
have other assignments in more companies. 
Differently from what emerged years ago, more 
recent studies have shown a negative influence 
between other tasks and business value, just as this 
analysis demonstrates. 
The size of the Board of Directors is positively 
correlated to the performance variable because more 
numerous human capital increases the skills in the 
company. Another point of the analysis is the 
presence of women in the Board of Directors. 
The study by Byron and Post (2016) highlights 
the positive correlation between women in the Board 
of Directors and company performance. 
In fact, women are considered positively as a 
precious element for companies above all because 
they are able to provide creativity, allowing them to 
find innovative solutions to corporate problems. 
To summarize, from the analysis of economic 
literature we can deduce, for almost all the variables 
taken into consideration in the analysis, the 
presence of conflicting results. However, it is evident 
that those companies, with weak governance 
structures and with poor shareholder protection, 
have agency problems. Therefore, only by having an 
effective Board of Directors can be reduced or 
avoided the opportunistic behaviour of managers, 
trying to outline the objectives of management with 
those of stakeholders. 
Among the various empirical studies, however, 
different results could be obtained attributable to 
various differences, such as, for example, the choice 
of the variables used to measure corporate 
governance, differences in the institutional context, 





This paper aimed to analyse the Italian context and 
the role of corporate governance in influencing the 
performance of engineering companies belonging to 
the public utilities sector listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
In the research, we saw how the governance 
variables had a positive influence on the profitability 
of the companies, including the size of the Board of 
Directors. From this last item, it was possible to 
assess that increasing its members corresponds to 
an increase in the corporate performance, precisely 
because the greater number of Directors allows 
greater supervision of managers, dissuading 
possible opportunistic behaviour which may 
compromise companies’ value. 
Then, a larger number of independent directors 
within the Boards allows for stronger governance as 
well; this because may adequately monitor the 
operations of managers and corporate strategies. 
As for the CEO duality, on the other hand, a 
negative correlation was achieved with company 
performance and this result stems from the fact that 
the CEO, having both decision-making and 
operational power, can exploit this “dominant” 
position to take opportunistic attitudes in contrast 
with minority shareholders. 
Contrary to some research hypotheses, 
directors with other appointments positively 
influence the company performance because of 
greater competence and experience developed 
participating at different Boards. 
The analysis also highlighted the positive 
influence of the greater presence of women within 
the Boards of Directors on company performance. 
The female presence, however, has been 
increased thanks to the “pink quotas”, a law that 
represents one of the most significant initiatives 
implemented in Italy in the field of gender equality. 
But there is still a long way to go and, in the present 
analysis, it is demonstrated by the fact that on the 
sample analysed no woman covers the role of 
president within the Board of Directors. These 
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barriers will be break only when gender equality is 
completely integrated into Italian culture. The 
results obtained with the empirical analysis, 
therefore, support the hypothesis of a positive 
correlation between corporate governance and 
performance. 
This work, therefore, aims to highlight the 
importance of drafting a satisfactory governance 
report so that the social partners can be effectively 
oriented. 
The results showed we have received do not 
allow us to arrive at completely unequivocal 
interpretations; the main limit is the sample size 
used in this study was relatively small. 
The authors argue that in public service 
companies the presence of independent subjects is 
fundamental in the composition of the governing 
bodies (in particular in the board of directors) in 
order to balance the various interests. 
In public services, it is precisely the board of 
directors that plays the role of safeguarding and 
negotiating the various interests between the parties 
involved, balancing the power of the majority 
shareholders. For the future, the extension of the 
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